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Trade Regulation-1963 Tennessee Survey
Leo J. Raskind*
I. THE
II.
III.

CONSTITUIONALITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT

I. TBE CoNsTrrunoNALrrY oF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

In two cases, McKesson & Robbins v. Government Employees Department Store, Inc.,' and its companion, Plough, Inc. v. Hogue &
Knott Super Market,2 the challenge to resale price maintenance,
already successful in twenty-three other states, was brought to the
Tennessee Supreme Court by appeals from two opinions holding the
Tennessee Fair Trade Law unconstitutional. 3 The historical background of fair trade legislation and the national controversy surrounding it since 1951 provide essential elements of perspective for
consideration of these two cases.
The Tennessee act,4 which is similar to fair trade statutes enacted
in forty-five states between 1931 and 1941, permits a manufacturervendor of a trade-marked or branded product to contract with a
distributor-wholesaler or retailer to set the minimum resale price
of such product.5 Prices set by such contracts are, by the so-called
"non-signer" clause, made binding on all dealers in the jurisdiction
with notice of the basic contract irrespective of whether any dealer
has himself entered into such contract. Most statutes provide for
civil sanctions in the form of a suit for breach of contract against
a signatory party or a statutory action for damages, or an injunction
against a non-signer. The effect of such a fair trade statute is to
permit a qualifying manufacturer-vendor to blanket the jurisdiction6
with his resale price, and to effectively require adherence to it.
Such a bar against competitive pricing which, under section 1 of
the Sherman Act and under section 5 of the Federal Trade Coin-
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1. McKesson & Bobbins, Inc. v. Government Employees Dep't Store, Inc., 211 Tenn.
494, 365 S.W.2d 890 (1963).
2. Plough, Inc. v. Hogue & Knott Super Market, 211 Tenn. 480, 365 S.W.2d 884
(1963).
3. TRAn REG. REP. f[
6041 (1963).
4. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 69-201, -205 (1956).
5.Id. ff 6017; Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements
Affecting Chattels,49 YALE LJ. 607 (1940).
6. Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws, 46 ILL. L.
REv. 349, 351 (1951).
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mission Act would be illegal, is permitted by qualifying federal
7
legislation where state law allows.
The current tide of attacks on fair trade legislation which began
with the striking down of the non-signers clauses by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1951 initiated the present controversy.
Congress, in 1952, reaffirmed resale price maintenance in the McGuire
Act.8 Successive sessions of Congress have had before it further
broadening legislation. The Quality Stabilization Bill (S. 774) is
currently before the Senate Commerce Committee. 9
At stake is the basic issue of whether price competition is to be
dominant in the distribution of trade-marked or branded goods at
the retail level; the policy of competition as a preferred mode of
economic organization is firmly embedded in national and state legislation. 0 This trend of attacks on state legislation had its counterpart
in recommendations for the repeal of the federal enabling legislation. The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws recommended
Congressional repeal both of the Miller-Tydings amendment to the
Sherman Act and the McGuire amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act thereby subjecting resale price maintenance, as other price-

fixing practices, to those Federal antitrust controls which safeguard the
public by keeping the channels of distribution free.11

Alaska, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont have no
fair trade laws; Virginia and Ohio have fair trade laws, but without
the broadening non-signer's clause.12 The President's Council of
Economic Advisors has recently stated its opposition to resale price
maintenance. 13 In England resale price maintenance has been abandoned at the urging of the Conservative party after a decade of
controversy.' 4
The historical development of fair trade legislation casts further
7. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
8. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958); see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 381 (1952).
9. TRADE REG. REP., No. 146, May 18, 1964.
10. Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, State Antitrust
Statutes, Employment Act of 1946, Surplus Property Act of 1944. (All these statutes
stand for the proposition that competition is preferred); see also Rose, Resale Price
Maintenance,3 VAND. L. Ruv. 24, 43 (1949).
11. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTrrUsT LAWS 154 (1955); see generally, FTC REPORT ON RESALE PRuCE MAINTENANCE (1945).
12. 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6017 (1963).
13. JoINT ECONOMIC Com., 88TH CONG., IST SEss. 2-3, PROBABLE EFFECTS OF TiE
PROPosED QUrA=

STABILIZATION ACT ON PRICES, INCOMES, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRO-

DUCTION, (Joint Comm. Print 1963); see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISEnS, TImRD
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (1948).
14. N. Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964, p. 47; see also Harbury and Raskind, The British
Approach to Monopoly Control, 67 Q.J. ECON. 380 (1953).
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doubt on its utility. Originating during the Great Depression as a
means of protecting the smaller retail drug and grocery outlets from
what was deemed to be unfair competitive advantages enjoyed by
large cut-rate retailers, this legislation was part of a larger effort to
mitigate the rigors of the depression by abandoning competition. 15
The National Industrial Recovery Act and its industry codes of fair
competition represented the broadest application of the principle of
coordinated price determination as an anti-depression measure. 6
Fair trade legislation was not affected by the demise of the N.R.A.
in the Schechter case, since fair trade laws were created as exemptions to the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts, with
coordinate state legislation.
In the instant cases the supreme court reversed the lower courts.
In the Plough case, the attack on the constitutionality of the Tennessee Fair Trade Law was raised as a defense in a suit by a manufacturer-vendor to enjoin a non-signer retailer from selling the
product below the price agreed upon by the manufacturer and
signatory retailers who were competitors of the defendant.' In
reversing the holding of unconstitutionality by the chancellor below,
the late Chief Justice Prewitt, in a short opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the fair trade law by holding that the statute was
neither an undue delegation of a legislative function nor an excessive
extension of the police power of the state. 18 By resting the reversal,
in effect, on the two earlier opinions of his court which had upheld
the constitutionality of the Fair Trade Law, the late Chief Justice
did not address himself to the issue raised by the defense, for the
police power question had not been raised or adjudicated in those
prior opinions.' 9
In the McKesson case, Chief Justice Burnett did consider the two
issues of whether the act was within the constitutional limits of the
police power contained in article I, sections 8 and 21, and the limitation on undue delegation of legislative authority contained in article
II, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. 20 In an extended opinion,
the chancellor had found the act unconstitutional as an unlawful
exercise of the police power contained in article I, section 8 of the
Constitution. In answer to the appeal from the chancellor's opinion,
the appellees filed cross-petitions urging that the act also violated
article II, section 17 as being deficient in the title of the act. This
15. See Shulman, supra note 5, at 617.
16. PA.A MoUNTir, THE PoLITIcs OF DxTumnnoN 5-23 (1955).
17. See notes 1 & 2 supra.

18. Ibid.

19. See, McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Government Employees Dep't Store, Inc., supra
note 1, at 498, 365 S.W.2d at 891.

20. Ibid.
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latter point was dismissed by the chief justice on the authority of
CosmopolitanLife v. Northington.21
On the question of the use of police power, the chief justice considered the issue to be governed by the test of whether the requirement of obedience to the resale price determined by the manufacturer-vendor was a reasonable exercise of the police power designed to
promote the public convenience or the general welfare. Applying
this test to the statute, the court held that the determination of
resale prices by a manufacturer under the act is justified, if not
required, as a necessary means of protecting the reputation (goodwill)
of a trade-marked product.
The chief justice rejected the position taken by the chancellor
below, that the Schwegman cases which outlawed the non-signer
clause, had repudiated at least part of the Old Dearborn opinion
which had originally validated fair trade legislation. 22 Similarly, the
court refused to give any weight to the trend of state court opinions
in twenty-two other jurisdictions which held related statutes unconstitutional. Here the court stressed the position that changes in fair
trade legislation must come from the legislature, noting, "the Legis23
lature is more or less the body who forms our public policy."
Thus the opinion does not indicate the nature of the manufacturer's
interest in the branded product, nor the manner in which it would
be injured by a sale below the manufacturer's minimum resale price.
Goodwill is a slippery concept.24 That a consumer seeking brand
Alpha shoe polish will conclude that it is an inferior product because
he can purchase it for 27 cents rather than for 29 cents, is not borne
out by experience. The interest of a manufacturer of a trade-marked
product is obvious if his well-known product is sold at severely
reduced prices (at cost or less than cost) as either "distress merchandise" or as part of a program by a retailer to feature "loss
leaders."
There are at least two attributes of a trade-marked product-its
name and its price.2 Different consumers are motivated in differing
degrees by both factors. It does not necessarily follow that complete
dominion over price by the manufacturer is necessary for the protection of his interest in the product name. Not every departure from
a stated price is a threat to the value of the name. The better view
21. Cosmopolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Northington, 201 Tenn. 541, 300 S.W.2d

911 (1957).
22. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
23. See note 19 supra at 503, 365 S.W.2d at 894.
24. See MoORE, LEGAL PROTECoN OF GOODWILL 6-7 (1936);

Note, 53 CoLum.

L. REv. 660, 671 (1953).
25. Nichols, The Rehabilitationof Pure Competition, 62 Q.J. ECON. 31 (1947).
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is that there is a range of prices, rather than a unique price, at which
a trade-marked commodity can be sold without injury to the brand,
between the cost of that product (including a fair profit for the
retailer) and the higher retail price set by a fair-trade manufacturer 26
To the extent that this characterization is accurate, the remedy of
resale price maintenance is overly protective of the legitimate interest of the manufacturer in the price component of this product.2 7
Resale price maintenance bars every departure from the manufacturers' suggested minimum even though complete uniformity in the
price of the product is not required to keep it from being identified
as distress merchandise or as a loss leader.
In view of the substantial body of economic and legal opinion
showing that resale price maintenance tends toward higher prices
and to deprive the consumer of the cost savings of an efficient
retailer, it is respectfully submitted that it would have been appropriate for the supreme
court to have affirmed the lower court opinion
28
in both cases.
II.

TFADEmARK INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR COMPETrrON

In Tigrett Industries, Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises, Inc., the

district court enjoined defendant's use of the mark, "Pitch-N-Field"
as an infringement of plaintiff's registered mark, "Pitch-Back" for an
identical toy deflecting device permitting a pitched baseball to be
returned to the pitcher.29 Plaintiff, doing business in Jackson, Tennessee, as a manufacturer of the "Pitch-Back" device under an
exclusive patent license, contended that defendant, a trading stamp
redemption firm, infringed the plaintiff's registered mark. The manufacturer of the infringing product, Plastic Block City, Inc., intervened and defended the action. Jurisdiction was grounded on trademark infringement, unfair competition (pendant jurisdiction), and
diversity of citizenship.30 The defense consisted of (1) an attack
on the validity of the plaintiff's mark as being merely descriptive of
the product, and (2) a rejection of the unfair competition count for
26. See Rose, supra note 10, at 46; see also

REPoRT oF THE ATroaRNEY GENERAi's
NAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTrrRsT LAws, supra note 11, at 153; Adams,
Resale PriceMaintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967, 970-73 (1955).

NAT

27. Adequate protection is available for the manufacturer against distress and lossleader selling by a "sales below cost statute." See Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113
S.W.2d 733 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-301 to -306 (1956); Clark, Statutory
Restrictions on Selling Below Cost, 11 VArND. L. REv. 105 (1957).
28. Note, 10 VArN. L. REv. 415 (1957). See also Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance
in the United States, 3 Bus. L. REv. 65 (1956).
29. Tigrett Industries, Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 313 (W.D.
Tenn. 1963).
30. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
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failure of the plaintiff's designation to attain secondary meaning,

and (3) absence of infringement because likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deceit of purchasers was lacking.

Judge Bailey Brown, in granting the injunction, found the plaintiffs mark valid, and avoided the more labyrinthine and metaphysical

concepts of unfair competition which some courts have utilized in

3
limiting emulation of product designation between competitors. '

The court applied as the ultimate test the likelihood of consumer
confusion, taking into account all the circumstances such as physical
similarity of the competing products, including the course of business conduct leading to the adoption of the emulating designation,
and the differences between the labels both visible and (when pro-

nounced) audible. Where many courts have given substantial weight
to the dollar value of advertising expenses as a measure of the

achievement of particular significance to consumers of the plaintiff's
mark, this court avoided the troublesome concept of secondary meaning in favor of utilizing the advertising history of plaintiff's mark as
an element of the fair conduct of the defendant in selecting his own
product designation. 32 From this perspective, and in the absence

of any offer of proof by defendant to the contrary, the court found
that the defendant knew of the plaintiff's product and of his designation at the time defendant decided to manufacture a competing
product.3 In these circumstances the court held that the defendant's

adoption of the competing symbol constituted a pattern of infringing
behavior. Relying on the late Judge Goodrich's test in the Q-Tips

case, Judge Brown found that the defendant failed to take the
requisite and available34 steps to minimize the close emulation of
the plaintiff's product.
Accordingly, this case stands for the proposition that a second

market entrant of an identical trade-marked product cannot approach
31. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber & Goldberg 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); John Roberts Mfg. Co. v. University of Notre Dame
du Lac, 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ind. 1957);
Mastererafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,
221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955), reversing 119 F. Supp.
209 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939);
Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Simulation of Rival Goods, 3 VmL. L. R.v. 333 (1958);
Pollack, Unfair Trading by Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 74,
78-81 (1962); Pollack, A Projection for the Revaluation of Unfair Competition, 13
Ono St. L.J. 187 (1952); Stem and Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest:
Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 935, 941
(1962).
32. Proof of extensive advertising may be a factor in establishing secondary meaning.
See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs
Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939); see also Brown, Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
33. See Tigrett Industries, Inc. v. Top Value Enterprises, supra note 29, at 315.
34. Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953).
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the product designation of a prior seller unless he (1) can establish
that the emulating designation was without knowledge of the earlier
usage, and/or (2) that the second entrant took reasonable steps to
differentiate his product from that of the prior seller.
III.

DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT

The design patent is part of the continuum of legal protection of
product designation and configuration ranging from patent and
copyright protection to common law doctrines of unfair competition.
The operative provision of the statute granting protection of design

provides (in part) "whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent
therefor .... ,3 In construing the phrase, "new, original and ornamental design," the courts have applied to the design patent the
standard of originality required for ordinary patent protection.36
Hollister, Inc. v. Tran-sel, Inc., raised a tangled skein of relation-

ship between an employer and a former employee turned competitor.37 Hollister, a large hospital supply firm and the holder of two

design patents covering the ornamental designs of a hospital bed
card holder and of an umbilical cord clamp, sued Tran-sel and one
Laugherty, a former salesperson, to enjoin alleged infringement of
its design patent and to end unfair competition. The defenses raised
were the invalidity of the patents, non-infringement, and the absence
of unfair competition either by a breach of confidential relationship
counterclaimed alleging violation
or by palming off. The defendant
38
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.

The court, applying Tennessee law to the issue of breach of a
confidential relationship, found that the defendant's employment as
a salesperson for one year, failed to establish a confidential relationship. 39 Similarly, the court found insubstantial evidence of actual
confusion among purchasers of the two products at issue, and found
further that the plaintiff's product had attained no secondary meaning. Moreover, the products of the defendant were found to be
effectively identified as emanating from the defendant. These findings coalesced in the dismissal of the palming-off count of unfair
competition.
The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed for lack of any evi35. 66 Stat. 805 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1958).
36. International Silver Co. v. Pomerantz, 271 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1959); Burgess

Vibrocrafters, Inc. v. Atkins Industries, Inc., 204 F.2d 311 (7th Cr. 1953); Western
Auto Supply Co. v. American-National Co., 114 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1940).
37. Hollister, Inc. v. Tran-Sel, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
38. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
39. Neuhoff, Inc. v. Neuhoff Packing Co., 167 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1948).
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dence that plaintiff had violated any part of section 2 of the Sherman
40
Act with respect to any part of the hospital supply trade.
On the main branch of the case, Judge Taylor applied the accepted standard for adjudging the validity of a design patent. With
regard to the bed sign patent, the court found that various kinds
of similar signs had been in use for many years and that the plaintiff's
design patent was invalid for want of the requisite "inventive
genious" needed to distinguish a patentable departure over the prior
art from a mere regrouping of known design elements. 41 In assessing
the changes made by plaintiff in the traditional hospital bed sign,
the court found the changes in slant and in slot were induced by
functional considerations derived from use, rather than from design
novelty.
The court applied the same standard of inventiveness to the
plaintiff's claim for design patent protection for the umbilical cord
clamp as it utilized for the bed sign. On this basis it found the
claimed innovations by the plaintiff fell short of the requisite inventive ingredient and that the clamp embodied no new, original,
or ornamental design which warranted patent protection.
40. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
41. 223 F. Supp. at 145.

